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Abstract. In human interactions, trust is regularly updated during a
discussion. For example, if someone is caught lying, any further utter-
ances they make will be discounted, until trust is regained. This paper
seeks to model such behaviour by introducing a dialogue game which
operates over several iterations, with trust updates occurring at the end
of each iteration. In turn, trust changes are computed based on intuitive
properties, captured through three rules. By representing agent knowl-
edge within a preference-based argumentation framework, we demon-
strate how trust can change over the course of a dialogue.
1 Introduction
Within a dialogue, participants exchange arguments, aiming to achieve some
overarching goals. Typically, these participants have partial information and
individual preferences and goals, and the parties aim to achieve an outcome
based on these individual contexts. Importantly, some dialogue participants may
be malicious or incompetent, and — to achieve desirable dialogical outcomes —
the inputs from these parties should be discounted. In human dialogues, such
participants are characterised by the lack of trust ascribed to them, and in this
work we consider how such trust should be computed.
While previous work [12] has considered how the trust of participants should
be updated following a dialogue, we observe that in long-lasting human dis-
cussions, trust can change during the dialogue itself. For example, within a
courtroom, a witness who repeatedly appears to lie will not be believed even
if they later act honestly. Trust can be viewed as making the arguments of more
trusted agents be preferred — in the eyes of those observing the dialogue — to
the arguments of less trusted agents. Importantly, there appears to be a feed-
back cycle at play within dialogue: low trust in a dialogue participant can lead
to further reductions of trust as they are unable to provide sufficient evidence to
be believed. To accurately model dialogue and reason about the trust ascribed
to its participants, it is critical to take this feedback cycle between utterances
and trust into account. This paper considers such a feedback cycle.
The research questions we address in this work are as follows. 1) How should
trust change during the course of a dialogue based on the utterances made by di-
alogue participants? 2) How should trust affect the justified conclusions obtained
from a dialogue?
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To answer these questions, we describe a dialogue model in which participants
interact by exchanging arguments. Within this model, we define a trust relation
for each participant with respect to other participants (encoded as a preference
ordering over the participants), and describe how each participant updates its
trust relation. In particular, each participant observes the behaviours of others
and uses these observations as an input to update its trust relation (for the other
participants) through a trust update function.
To compute the justified conclusions of a dialogue, we instantiate a preference-
based argumentation framework (PAF) [1]. As a result, each participant can
identify its own set of preferred conclusions, and a set of justified conclusions
can be identified from these sets.
The proposed framework permits us to better represent the feedback rela-
tionship between trust and dialogue. The remainder of the paper is organised
as follows: Section 2 recalls preference-based argumentation frameworks [1] and
provides a brief overview of our notion of trust in dialogues. Section 3 describes
our proposed dialogue model. Section 4 describes the trust update rules and
the process we considered for dynamically updating trust within our dialogue
model. Section 5 describes how the preference-based argumentation framework
is instantiated in our model. Section 6 illustrates how trust update rules are ap-
plied through an example. Section 7 compares our approach with some existing
works. Section 8 presents our conclusions and some directions for future work.
2 Background
Preference-based argumentation frameworks extend abstract argumentation frame-
works [7], and we therefore begin by describing the former.
Definition 1. An Argumentation Framework F is defined as a pair 〈A,R〉
where A is a set of arguments and R is a binary attack relation on A.
Extensions are sets of arguments that are, in some sense, justified. These
extensions are computed using one of several argumentation semantics.
Preference-based argumentation frameworks [1] seek to capture the relative
strengths of arguments and can be instantiated in different ways. In this paper,
we will use preference-based argumentation frameworks to encode trust in other
dialogue participants, allowing us to compute which arguments should, or should
not be considered justified.
Within a preference-based argumentation framework, preferences are en-
coded through a reflexive and transitive binary relation ≥ over the arguments
of A. Given two arguments φ1, φ2 ∈ A, φ1 ≥ φ2 means that φ1 is at least as
preferred as φ2. The relation > is the strict version of ≥ i.e., φ1 > φ2 iff φ1 ≥ φ2
but φ2  φ1. As usual, φ1 = φ2 iff φ1 ≥ φ2 and φ2 ≥ φ1.
Given this, a preference-based argumentation framework is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A Preference-based argumentation framework (PAF for short)
[1] is a tuple T = 〈A,R,≥〉 where A is a set of arguments, R ⊆ A × A is
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an attack relation and ≥ ⊆ A × A is a (partial or total) preorder on A. The
extensions of T under a given semantics are the extensions of the argumentation
framework (A,Rr), called the repaired framework, under the same semantics
with Rr = {(φ1, φ2)|(φ1, φ2) ∈ R and (φ2 6> φ1)}
⋃{(φ2, φ1)|(φ1, φ2) ∈ R and
φ2 > φ1}.
Given a PAF, one can identify different sets of justified conclusions by con-
sidering different extensions. PAFs extend standard Dung argumentation frame-
works with the addition of preferences between arguments to repair critical at-
tacks and refine the extension of the repaired PAF. Therefore, we also define the
semantics of standard argumentation frameworks, the notion of critical attacks
and extension refinement. In this paper we will focus on the preferred semantics.
Definition 3. Given F = 〈A,R〉, a set of arguments E ⊆ A is said to be
conflict-free iff ∀φ1, φ2 ∈ E, there is no (φ1, φ2) ∈ R. Given an argument φ1 ∈ E,
E is said to defend φ1 iff for all φ2 ∈ A, if (φ2, φ1) ∈ R then there is a φ3 ∈ E
such that (φ3, φ2) ∈ R. E is admissible iff it is conflict-free and defends all
its elements. E is a complete extension iff there are no other arguments which
it defends. E is a preferred extension iff it is a maximal (with respect to set
inclusion) complete extension.
Preferred semantics admit multiple extensions; here, such an extension rep-
resents a potentially justified view (which conflicts with other views). If an ar-
gument is present in all extensions, then it is sceptically justified; while if it is
present in at least one extension, it is credulously justified.
Definition 4. (Critical attack)[1]. Let F be an argumentation framework and
≥⊆ A×A. An attack (φ2, φ1) ∈ R is critical iff φ1 > φ2.
PAFs repair critical attacks on the graph of attacks by inverting the arrow
of the attack relation (i.e., (φ2, φ1) ∈ R with φ1 > φ2 becomes (φ1, φ2) ∈
R). This repair property ensures that arguments that are more preferred in an
argumentation framework defeat arguments that are less preferred. An argument
φ1 defeats φ2 iff ((φ1, φ2) or (φ2, φ1)) ∈ R and φ1 > φ2. For a symmetric attack
relation, removing critical attacks gives the same results as inverting attacks.
Extensions are then constructed from the corresponding repaired PAF using the
semantics of F . In addition, in PAFs, a refinement relation is used to refine the
results of a framework by comparing its extensions.
Definition 5. (Refinement relation) [1]. Let (A,≥) be such that A is a set of
arguments and ≥ ⊆ A×A is a (partial or total) preorder. A refinement relation
denoted by ≥r, is a binary relation on P(A)2 such that ≥r is reflexive, transitive
and for all E ⊆ A, for all φ1, φ2 ∈ A\E , if φ1 > φ2 then E
⋃{φ1} >r E ⋃{φ2}.
Let Ags be a set of participants within a dialogue. We consider that each
dialogue participant Agi ∈ Ags, for i = 1, . . . , n, has an associated trust relation
over other participants, encoded through a preference ordering Agi .
Definition 6. Let Ags be a set of dialogue participants. The trust relation of
a given participant Agi over Ags is a preference ordering Agi ⊆ Ags × Ags.
Agj Agi Agk denotes that Agi prefers (trusts) Agj to Agk .
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We consider the following properties for the trust relation:
– Non-Symmetric: if a participant Agi trusts another participant Agj , this
does not imply that Agj trusts Agi .
– Transitive: Unlike some other works on trust [9, 17], we assume that tran-
sitivity of trust (also known as derived trust) is not required in our model.
As a result, we assume that a given participant has the ability to decide
whether or not to trust another participant at any stage of the dialogue.
The trust relation represents the viewpoint of a given participant independently
of the trust relations of other participants. Therefore, unlike the systems de-
scribed in, for example, [9, 17], there is no need to represent a ‘global map’ of
trust relations — a trust network — in our model.
3 A Formal Dialogue Model
We consider a dialogue system where each participant Agi has two main com-
ponents: a knowledge base (containing its trust relation over other participants,
a set of arguments, and a set of attacks between arguments) and a commitment
store. We follow Hamblin (as cited in [19]) in defining a commitment store as
a “store of statements” that represents the arguments a participant is publicly
committed to.
Definition 7. The knowledge base of a participant Agi ∈ Ags is a tuple KBAgi =
〈AAgi ,RAgi ,Agi 〉, where AAgi is the set of arguments known by Agi (repre-
senting their own knowledge); RAgi ⊆ AAgi × AAgj is a set of attacks where
(φ1, φ2) ∈ RAgi iff φ1 ∈ AAgi and φ2 is an argument provided by any participant
Agj ; and Agi is the trust relation (c.f., Definition 6) of Agi with regards to
other participants.
Each participant updates its knowledge base at the end of each iteration
of a dialogue. Intuitively, an iteration represents a subdialogue, including an
exchange of arguments arising from a participant’s (potentially) controversial
assertion. Unlike the knowledge base, the commitment store is updated after
every dialogue move made by the participant.
Definition 8. The commitment store of a participant Agi ∈ Ags at iteration
t ∈ {1 . . . n} is a set CS tAgi = {φ1, . . . , φn} which contains arguments introduced
into the dialogue by Agi at iteration t such that CS
0
Agi
= ∅.
The union of the commitment stores of all participants is called the universal
commitment store UCSt = ⋃Agi CS tAgi . An argument put forward by a partici-
pant may be attacked by an argument from another participant. Therefore, in
our dialogue system, an argumentation framework 〈UCSt,R〉 is induced by the
set of arguments exchanged during dialogue in the universal commitment store
and their respective attacking relationships as in [7]. Hence, (φ1, φ2) ∈ R if
(φ1, φ2) ∈ RAgi , φ1 ∈ CSAgi and φ2 ∈ UCSt. The universal commitment store
can be viewed as the global state of the dialogue at a given iteration.
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We now turn our attention to the dialogue game itself. A dialogue game like
the one described in [13] specifies the major elements of a dialogue, such as its
commencement, combination, and termination rules among others. Likewise, the
system described in [11] specifies how the topic of discussion in a dialogue can
be represented in some logical language. We are interested in how a participant
updates its commitment store and its trust relation in a dialogue when it, or other
participants, introduce arguments. We assume that at iteration t, a participant
is allowed to add arguments to its commitment store if it is not already present
within the store (and was not previously present), and retract arguments from
its commitment store only if the argument was already present in the store.
3.1 Protocol Rules and Speech Acts
Protocol rules regulate the set of legal moves that are permitted at each iteration
of a dialogue. In our framework, a dialogue consists of multiple discrete iterations
t within which the moves are made. A dialogue move is referred to as M tx where
x , t ∈N, denoting that a move with identifier x is made at iteration t. At its most
general, a protocol identifies a legal move based on all previous dialogue moves.
Definition 9. A dialogue D consists of a sequence of iterations such that D =
[[M11 , . . . ,M
1
x ], . . . , [M
t
1, . . . ,M
t
x]]. The dialogue involves n participants Ag1 , . . . ,Agn
where (n ≥ 2 ). Within a dialogue D, iteration j consists of a sequence of moves
[M j1 , . . .M
j
x].
A dialogue participant evaluates the set of arguments exchanged within an iter-
ation to update its trust relation over other participants. Within each iteration,
there is a claim to be discussed and arguments that attack or defend the claim.
Note that a claim is abstractly represented as an argument. An iteration there-
fore represents a sub-discussion focused around a single topic of the overarching
dialogue, which can be treated in an atomic manner with regards to trust.
The dialogue protocol is as described in Figure 1. Each node — except the
‘update’ node (described in detail later) — represents a speech act, and the out-
going arcs from a node indicate possible responding speech acts. We consider
four types of speech acts, denoted assert(Agi , φ, t), contradict(Agi , φ1 , φ2 , t),
retract(Agi , φ, t), and exit respectively. A participant Agi uses assert(Agi , φ, t)
to put forward a claim φ ∈ AAgi at iteration t. A contradict(Agi , φ1 , φ2 , t) move
attacks a previous argument φ1 ∈ AAgj from another participant Agj by argu-
ment φ2 ∈ AAgi from participant Agi . A participant Agi uses retract(Agi , φ, t) to
retract its previous argument. A participant uses exit to exit an iteration. This
move is made when a participant has no more arguments to advance within the
iteration. When an iteration concludes (shown by the terminal update node in
the figure), trust is updated. The dialogue then proceeds to the next iteration,
or may terminate. A dialogue therefore consists of at least one, but potentially
many more, iterations.
In addition to the constraints on the type of speech act that can be made in
a dialogue, we also consider the relevance of a move. A move M tx+i , for x, i ≥ 1 is
relevant to iteration t if the argument of the move will affect the justification of
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the argument of the move M tx . Specifically, an argument φ2 in move M
t
x+i affects
the justification of an argument φ1 in M
t
x if it attacks φ1 (c.f., [14]). Relevance is
defined from the second move of an iteration (i.e., when x ≥ 1) because the first
move is taken to introduce the claim to be discussed in the iteration. The protocol
rules enforce that φ2 is relevant to an iteration t if it affects the justification of
φ1 that has been previously moved in the iteration. However, if φ1 is retracted in
the iteration, φ2 is no longer relevant and must be retracted except if it affects
the justification of another argument φ3. Furthermore, as the outgoing arcs in
Figure 1 depict, a move to exit an iteration is also considered relevant from the
second move but a move to retract an argument is only considered relevant from
the third move (i.e., when x ≥ 2). These constraints help to prevent participants
from making moves that are not relevant to the current iteration.
update
Assert
(Agi, φ, t)
contradict
(Agi, φ1, φ2, t)
retract
(Agi, φ, t)
exit
Fig. 1: Protocol Rules
3.2 Commitment Rules
A participant’s commitment store is revised throughout the dialogue as it ad-
vances arguments. Therefore, it is important to define how each of the proposed
speech acts updates a participant’s commitment store.
Definition 10. The commitment store of a participant Agi ∈ Ags is updated as
follows:
CS tAgi =

∅ iff t = 0,
CS t−1Agi
⋃{φ} iff mtx = assert(Agi , φ, t),
CS t−1Agi
⋃{φ2} iff mtx = contradict(Agi , φ1 , φ2 , t)
CS t−1Agi \ {φ} iff mtx = retract(Agi , φ, t)
CS t−1Agi iff m
t
x = exit
A Dynamic Model of Trust in Dialogues 7
4 Updating Trust
We now turn our attention to how trust should be updated as a dialogue pro-
gresses. We limit our focus to how the trust relation component of a participant’s
knowledge base (Agi) is updated. A trust update function is used to perform
this update when an iteration concludes, as represented by the ‘update’ node in
Figure 1.
As input, the trust update function takes a participant’s trust update rules
and its preference on the trust update rules. In the remainder of this section, we
formalise both of these concepts.
Trust update rules describe the situations in which trust in a dialogue par-
ticipant should change. In this paper, we consider the following trust update
rules.
– A dialogue participant whose arguments are self-contradicting should be less
trusted than a consistent participant.
– A dialogue participant who is unable to justify its arguments should be less
trusted than one who can.
– A dialogue participant who regularly retracts arguments should be less trusted
than one who does not.
These rules are similar to some of the properties that have been considered in the
literature of ranking-based semantics for abstract argumentation (for a review
on ranking-based semantics for abstract argumentation, see [3]). These rules are
also supported by extension-based semantics (i.e., Dung’s semantics [7]). For
instance, the second rule could be represented as a participant having an argu-
ment φ in its commitment store, but not within an extension: φ /∈ E(〈UCS,R〉)3.
We do not claim that the three trust update rules considered in this paper are
exhaustive, and intend to investigate additional rules, taken from sources such
as [3], in the future. We formalise the three trust update rules as follows.
Definition 11. Self Contradicting Arguments (SC): A participant Agi is self
contradicting if CSAgi is not conflict free.
Definition 12. Lack of Justification (LJ): A participant Agi lacks justification
for an argument φ1 iff φ1 ∈ CSAgi and there is a φ2 ∈ UCS\CSAgi such that φ2
defeats φ1.
Defeats consider preferences among attacks and are defined in Section 2.
Definition 13. Argument Retraction (AR): A participant Agi is inconsistent
iff φ1 ∈ CSAgi and there is a φ2 ∈ UCS\CSAgi such that φ2 attacks φ1 and Agi
retracts φ1 from CSAgi .
3 Here, E represents the extension(s) obtained on the argumentation framework
〈UCS,R〉.
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This rule also requires that if φ2 attacks φ1 and φ1 is retracted by Agi , Agj is
expected to retract φ2 as enforced by the dialogue protocol without any loss of
trust for Agj except if φ2 attacks another argument φ3 that is not retracted.
Given the three trust update rules considered, there are four possible com-
binations of these rules in an iteration. These possible combinations are given
below.
– (SC, LJ, AR): This combination means all the three trust updates rules
occur within a particular iteration under consideration.
– (SC, LJ): This combination means self contradiction and lack of justification
occur within a particular iteration under consideration.
– (SC, AR): This combination means self contradiction and argument retrac-
tion occur within a particular iteration under consideration.
– (LJ, AR): This combination means lack of justification and argument re-
traction occur within a particular iteration under consideration.
Note that within an iteration, the arrangement of trust update rules in a com-
bination is not important. For instance, (SC, AR) and (AR, SC) is considered
to be the same combination.
Agents have preferences over trust update rules. For example, one may trust
somebody who contradicts themselves much less than they trust someone who
regularly retracts arguments. Such preferences on trust update rules are a partial
order over trust update rules. This partial order specifies the order of importance
a given participant attaches to the trust update rules.
Definition 14. Let TRtAgs = {SC,LJ,AR} be a set of trust update rules for the
set of participants Ags at iteration t. A given participant’s preference on TRtAgs
is a partial ordering tAgi (TR) such that for rules X ,Y ∈ TRtAgs , X tAgi (TR) Y
denotes rule X has preference over rule Y in tAgi (TR).
Since we are concerned with the viewpoint of a given participant, dialogue
participants may have varying preferences on trust update rules. Furthermore,
such preferences may change from one iteration to another. For instance, in a
particular iteration, a given participant may consider argument retraction as
the least inconsistent behaviour if a target participant retracts an argument
from its commitment store as a result of learning from the arguments of other
participants that the retracted argument is inaccurate. This may not be the case
if the target participant is forced to retract an argument from its commitment
store as a result of its inability to advance other arguments to defend it.
If the preference on the trust update rules of a given participant Agi is
Agi (TR) = (SC Agi (TR) LJ Agi (TR) AR), then, self contradiction is most
important when updating the participant’s trust relation, followed by lack of
justification and argument retraction respectively.
Consider a dialogue participant Agi , with a trust update function denoted by
UF at iteration t of a dialogue. The participant exchanges arguments with other
participants in the dialogue through defined speech acts and protocol rules. It
updates its commitment store CS tAgi after each of its moves m
t
x in the dialogue.
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It observes some trust updates rules based on the observed behaviours of other
participants in a particular iteration of the dialogue. As earlier stated, the com-
mitment store of all dialogue participants is publicly observable. Agi updates its
trust relation Agi over other participants based on its trust update rules and
preference on the rules tAgi (TR), repeating the process in the next iteration.
We formalise the trust update function as follows.
Definition 15. Let TRtAgi be the trust update rules of a given participant Agi ;
tAgi (TR) be the participant’s preference on the trust update rules; and tAgi its
trust relation over other participants at iteration t ∈ {1 . . . n}. The trust update
function UF is a function of the form UF : (TRtAgi× tAgi (TR)) →tAgi which
takes in Agi’s trust update rules and current trust preferences, and returns an
updated set of trust preferences.
A given participant’s trust relation over other participants is updated via the
trust update function. Such a relation provides the basis for computing what the
participant deems justified in an iteration.
In the next section, we analyse how each participant computes extensions in
their personalised preference-based argumentation frameworks.
5 Dialogue Outcome
Given an argumentation framework induced by the set of arguments exchanged
during dialogue in the universal commitment store and their respective attacking
relationships. Also, given a preference ordering over dialogue participants, we
instantiate a PAF by providing a rational basis for the preferences between
arguments. We prefer arguments φ1 ≥ φ2 (or strictly prefer arguments φ1 > φ2)
iff there are some dialogue participants Agi and Agj such that φ1 ∈ CSAgi , φ2 ∈
CSAgj and Agi  Agj (respectively Agi  Agj ). If there are critical attacks in
〈UCS,R〉, the attacks are repaired (c.f., Section 2). Moreover, the extensions
generated from the 〈UCS,R〉 are refined as shown in Section 2.
Since the preference orderings over dialogue participants represent the view-
point of a given participant in our model, it is possible to have as many preference
orderings over participants as the number of participants in a dialogue. By im-
plication, the notions of preferences between arguments; critical attacks; and
argument defeat are relative to each participant. In what follows, we introduce
the notion of a participant for a PAF similar to the notion of an audience in
[2]. Participants are individuated by their preferences over other dialogue par-
ticipants leading to their preferences between arguments. The arguments in the
UCS will then be evaluated by each participant in accordance with its preferences
between arguments. This leads to the following argument framework.
Definition 16. Let Ags be a set of participants {Ag1 , . . . ,Agn}
then for i = 1 , . . . ,n, the preference-base argumentation framework of partici-
pant Agi is a tuple TAgi = 〈A,R,AAgi 〉 where A ⊆ UCS is a set of arguments,
R ⊆ A×A is an attack relation and AAgi⊆ A×A is a (partial or total) preorder
on A according to Agi .
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An attack succeeds in the preference-based argumentation framework of a
participant if it is not a critical attack or if the participant has no preference
between the arguments. Thus, the set of defeat relations (attacks that succeed) in
one participant’s context may be different from the one in another participant’s
context. An argument φ1 ∈ A defeats another argument φ2 ∈ A iff (φ1, φ2) ∈ R
and φ2 6AAgi φ1. Further, note that the preferred semantics of TAgi may return
a different refined preferred extension EAgi to the preferred semantics of TAgj .
Definition 17. A set of arguments EAgi in a preference-based argumentation
framework TAgi is a preferred extension for a participant Agi if it is maximal
(with respect to set inclusion) complete extension obtained from TAgi .
To define the set of justified conclusions in our model, we borrow the notions
of objectively acceptable and subjectively acceptable arguments from [2].
Definition 18. Given a preference-based argumentation framework
TAgs = 〈A,R,AAgs〉 for some participants Ags, an argument φ is objectively
acceptable iff for all Agi ∈ Ags, φ is in every EAgi . On the other hand, φ is
subjectively acceptable iff for some Agi ∈ Ags, φ is in some EAgi .
In the discussion thus far, we have shown that each dialogue participant com-
putes its preferred extensions in a dialogue based on preference ordering (i.e.,
trust) over the other dialogue participants — leading to preference ordering over
arguments. It then follows that out of the set of preferred extensions a given
participant may have, the refined preferred extension is the extension whose ar-
guments are more trusted than the other extensions in the set. Consequently,
the set of objectively acceptable arguments is the set that the participants si-
multaneously considered as the most trusted set of arguments in the dialogue.
We consider this set as the most justified conclusion of a dialogue similar to how
the set of sceptically justified arguments is considered as the set of most justified
arguments in standard argumentation frameworks and PAF. With this property,
we show how trust can have an effect on the justified conclusions of a dialogue.
Next, we consider the notion of a cycle within the preference ordering.
Definition 19. A preference-based argumentation framework
TAgs = 〈A,R,AAgs〉 for participants Ags has a cycle iff there are two arguments
φ1, φ2 ∈ A such that φ1 AAgs φ2 and φ2 AAgs φ1
Proposition 1. Assume preferred semantics, for any TAgi , if (φ1, φ2) ∈ R and
φ2 AAgi φ1, then φ1 is not accepted — φ1 6∈ EAgi .
Proof. For any TAgi that is cycle free, there is a unique corresponding F , FAgi =
〈A,R〉, such that an element of attack relation (φ1, φ2) ∈ R in FAgi is an element
of defeat relation (φ1, φ2) ∈ R in TAgi . Therefore, the preferred extension of
FAgi will contain the same arguments as the preferred extension of TAgi . If
TAgi is cycle free, it means there is a preference ordering AAgs over A. For
φ1, φ2 ∈ A, (φ1, φ2) ∈ R and φ2 AAgi φ1. The attack from φ1 to φ2 will be
inverted. Therefore, this attack will not appear in FAgi . Instead, an attack from
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φ2 to φ1 will appear and since attack from φ1 to φ2 is not in FAgi , φ2 is accepted
in a preferred extension of FAgi and φ1 rejected. This applies to TAgi since TAgi
corresponds to FAgi .
Proposition 2. Suppose TAgi has a cycle between all arguments (i.e., (∀φ1, φ2 ∈
A) s.t .(φ1, φ2) ∈ R, φ1 =AAgi φ2), then any extension of TAgi is also an extension
of Dung’s framework F = (A,R) and vice versa under the same semantics.
Proof. This follows from Definition 2 and Proposition 1.
This property ensures that when Agi has equal or no preferences for some ar-
guments in TAgi , then there can be no critical attacks between these arguments
and preferences play no role in the evaluation of this set of arguments.
Proposition 3. If a set of arguments S ∈ A is objectively acceptable in all
preferred extensions EAgs of TAgs for all the participants Ags in a dialogue, then
the set S is the set most trusted arguments in the dialogue.
Proof. Since every EAgi is conflict free as the preferred extensions of PAF and
corresponding F are conflict free, it follows that in TAgi , every φ1 ∈ EAgi is either
unattacked or attacked by some argument φ2 ∈ A\EAgi such that φ1 AAgi φ2.
For the latter, we know that such attack is critical and is repaired such that
(φ2, φ1) ∈ R becomes (φ1, φ2) ∈ R. If φ1 is objectively acceptable in all preferred
extensions EAgs of TAgs , it follows that in all TAgi ⊆ TAgs , φ1 is either unattacked
or is attacked by some less preferred argument φ2. Since, φ1 AAgi φ2 denotes that
φ1 is more trusted (more preferred) than φ2, it follows that the set of arguments
S ⊆ EAgs = {φ1| 6 ∃φ2 ∈ A\EAgs such that (φ2, φ1) ∈ R and φ1 AAgi φ2} is the
set of most trusted arguments.
6 Example
To illustrate how a participant updates its trust relation with regards to other
participants, we provide an extended example, adapted from [16]. We connect
the arguments in the dialogue to the participants that advance them as shown in
the Speech Acts column of Table 1. The Moves column of the table shows that the
dialogue has two iterations with five moves in the first iteration and four moves in
the second iteration. Figures 2 and 3 show the argumentation frameworks derived
from the dialogue by one of the participants Agk . T tAgk represents argumentation
framework of Agk at iteration t where nodes are arguments and edges are attack
relation. Let us consider that participant Agk evaluates T 1Agk and T 2Agk .
1stIteration: Trust Update Rules TR1Agk — In this iteration, Agk observes
two trust update rules SC w.r.t Agi and LJ w.r.t Agj . Agk observes contradiction
in the commitment store of Agi (i.e., φ4 attacks φ1 by defending φ2 that attacks
φ1). Furthermore, Agk observes that Agj lacks justification for φ2 as φ5 defeats
φ2 (φ2 is defeated by an undefeated argument φ5 ). Note that the symmetric
attack between φ3 and φ4 is obtained by the attack from φ4 to φ3 exchanged
via the contradict move, while the φ3 to φ4 attack is known by Agk from its
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knowledge base KBAgk .
Preference on Trust Update Rules 1Agi (TR) — Let Agk ’s preference on the
trust update rules be LJ 1Agk (TR) SC 1Agk (TR) AR.
Trust Update Agk 1 — Given the trust update rules and Agk ’s preference on
the rules, from Definition 15, we can infer that Agk prefers (i.e., trusts) Agi to
Agj . Likewise, Agk prefers itself to Agi (i.e., 1Agk = Agk 1Agk Agi 1Agk Agj ).
Agk’s Conclusion EAgk — In T 1Agk , Agk considers that φ1 and φ5 defeat φ2, φ3
defeats φ4, and E1Agk is {φ1, φ3, φ5}.
2ndIteration: Trust Update Rules TR2Agk — Agk observes that Agj lacks
justification for φ6 and Agi lacks justification for φ7. Therefore, Agk observes
one trust update rule LJ w.r.t to both Agi and Agj .
Preference on Trust Update Rules 2Agk (TR) — Agk observes just one trust
update rule. Therefore, preference over the trust update rules is not applicable
in this iteration.
Trust Update Agk 2 — Note that, Agj has an undefeated argument φ9 in this
iteration while Agi has none. Therefore, Agk prefers Agj to Agi and itself to Agj
(i.e., 2Agk = Agk 2Agk Agj 2Agk Agi).
Agk’s Conclusion EAgk — In T 2Agk , Agk considers that φ8 defeats φ6, φ9 defeats
φ7, and E2Agk is {φ8, φ9}.
φ2 Agj
φ1 Agi φ5Agk
φ3
Agk
φ4
Agi
Fig. 2: T 1Agk for 1st iteration
φ7 Agi
φ6 Agj
φ9Agjφ8Agk
Fig. 3: T 2Agk for 2nd iteration
This example demonstrates how trust evolves in a dialogue and how such
trust is used as a basis for expressing preferences between the arguments ex-
changed in the dialogue. In addition, the example illustrates how trust affects
the justified conclusions obtained from a dialogue.
7 Related Work
Recent works on the integration of trust and argumentation has provided paradigms
for handling inherent uncertainties in the interactions among agents in multi-
agent systems. The importance of relating trust and argumentation was high-
lighted in [6]. In [10], arguments are considered as a separate source of informa-
tion for trust computation.
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Moves Speech Acts Arguments
m11 assert(Agi , φ1 , 1 ) φ1: Death penalty is a legitimate form of punishment
m12 contradict(Agj , φ1 , φ2 , 1 ) φ2: God does not want us to kill
m13 contradict(Agk , φ2 , φ3 , 1 ) φ3: God does not exist
m14 contradict(Agi , φ3 , φ4 , 1 ) φ4: Some people believe in God
m15 contradict(Agk , φ2 , φ5 , 1 ) φ5:
The legal status of the death penalty
should not depend on some random people’s belief
m21 assert(Agj , φ6 , 2 ) φ6: The state has no right to put its subjects to death
m22 contradict(Agi , φ6 , φ7 , 2 ) φ7:
If child rapists and murderers are put to death it
will reduce the number of suicides by the survivors
m23 contradict(Agk , φ6 , φ8 , 2 ) φ8:
Majority opinion in some democratic countries
favour death penalty
m24 contradict(Agj , φ7 , φ9 , 2 ) φ9:
There is no strong evidence that the death
penalty makes victims of child abuse feel good
Table 1: Example: Dialogue
There are four works in the literature which are closely related to the research
described in this paper. The first is [12], where the authors propose a model
of argumentation where arguments are related to their sources and a degree
of acceptability is computed on the basis of the trustworthiness degree of the
sources. The model also provides a feedback such that the final quality of the
arguments influences the source evaluation as well. In this approach, different
dimensions of trust are represented as graded beliefs ranging between 0 and 1
which change across different domains and arguments evaluated by a labelling
algorithm. The labelling algorithm computes a fuzzy set of accepted arguments
whose membership assigns to each argument a degree of acceptability unlike the
extension-based semantics that we apply in our approach.
While related, the work of [12] differs from the current paper in several ways.
First, the approach does not consider the cumulative effect of converging sources
on argument acceptability. We consider this effect in our model by categorising
accepted arguments into two categories namely objectively acceptable and subjec-
tively acceptable extensions, based on the number of sources that have the argu-
ments acceptable in their extensions. Second, unlike our approach, the evaluation
of the trustworthiness degree of a target agent is not induced by the trusting
agent’s argumentation framework, but determined by the internal mechanism of
the trusting agent. Third, [12] considers that in a dialogue, the final acceptability
value of the arguments provides a feedback on the trustworthiness degree in the
information source. In our approach, we observe that trust can change during
the dialogue itself and as such the trust rating of a target participant should be
updated at every stage (iteration) of a dialogue.
The works in [15, 17] are closely related to ours. The authors present a frame-
work which considers the source of arguments, and expresses a degree of trust in
them. They define trust-extended argumentation graphs in which each premise,
inference rule and conclusion of an argument is associated with the trustworthi-
ness degree of the source proposing it. In this approach, the trust rating asso-
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ciated with the arguments and their sources does not change. In our approach,
trust ratings associated with arguments and sources change between iterations.
This notion of dynamic trust rating is captured by socio-cognitive models of
trust [4] and other computational trust approaches [5, 8].
Lastly, [18] models the connection between arguments about the trustwor-
thiness of information sources and the arguments from the sources — as well as
the attacks between the arguments. An information source is introduced into an
argumentation framework as a meta-argument and an attack on the trustwor-
thiness of the source is modelled as an attack on the meta-argument. A source
is considered trustworthy if its meta-argument is accepted. Like us, [18] model
the feedback from sources to arguments and vice-versa. However, like [12], they
do not consider how trust evolves in the course of a dialogue.
8 Conclusions
This paper describes how trust changes during argumentation-based dialogues
and how such change affects the justified conclusion of the dialogue. In particular,
as arguments are exchanged in a dialogue, we formalise a number of trust update
rules that a given participant can take into consideration for updating its trust
relation over other target participants. The first contribution of our approach is
that it captures how trust is dynamically updated in dialectical argumentation
and how trust can affect the set of justified conclusions.
It is worth mentioning that the semantics of abstract argumentation frame-
works have only focused on identifying which points of view are defensible and
preference-based argumentation frameworks have extended these semantics to
deal with preferences between arguments. However, they do not describe why
one argument should be preferred over another. In our approach, the trust rat-
ing of the sources of arguments provides such a basis.
As future work, we intend to find out how change in trust in dialectical argu-
mentation can affect the goals and argumentative strategies of participants. In
addition, change in trust during a dialogue may require less trusted participants
to present more evidence for their arguments to be believed, while the burden of
proof reduces on more trusted participants. This is also an issue for future work.
Finally, we are investigating an orthogonal approach to modelling changes in
trust within an ongoing dialogue through the use of meta-argumentation. Doing
so will eliminate the need for discrete iterations as used in the current work, and
an empirical evaluation of the two approaches with regard to human intuitions
will allow us to determine which approach is more realistic and useful.
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